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| January 11, 2011 |
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| National Defense Program Outlines |
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The Kan government approved two defense programs December 17 in the cabinet meeting. One is the National Defense Program Outlines which timeframe coming ten years and the other is the Mid-Term Defense Program to span five years to come. The decisions are dangerous because the traditional stance of Japan, called the ‘basic defense initiative’, which has been represented by the ‘exclusively defensive policy’, is totally rejected. The programs make a drastic turn to a position of ‘dynamic defense capabilities’ to focus China and enhance a global security scheme based on the Japan-US Alliance.
JAPAN’S MILITARY BUILD-UP AGAINST CHINA – DANGEROUS AND USELESS STRATEGY
The new defense programs were compiled for the first time by the government of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Many people, including those who advocate the nationalist trend, cautiously watched developments of new policies. It is because the DPJ has abandoned a pledge made in the Manifesto - to take ‘political initiatives’, and in fact the ruling party totally follows decisions of the United States. Consequently, the new programs practically copied a concept and direction provided in the August report issued by the Security Council on the new national defense initiatives led by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
Dynamic Defense Force
The new guidelines specify: though it is unlikely a full scale war be waged in the international scene or against Japan, the ‘gray zone’ disputes, which means confrontation over territory, sovereignty and economic interests which does not escalate to wars, increase. The paper advocates that Japan should promote seamless effort in peace time as well as contingencies, covering outer space and cyber space.
Any confrontation or dispute has its own origin and requirements, but the guidelines refer to these conflicts, in general, in the military context, setting forth a concept of ‘diversification and criticality of military capabilities’. But the idea is deceptive as seamless capability to cope with all situations means indefinite military buildup.
The new guidelines, denying the traditional initiative of basic defense abilities, promote dynamic capabilities supported by conformity, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility. The council of two ministries advised to renounce the previous initiative which has been served as a proof of ‘exclusively defensive policy’ for the past 34 years and told to shift to a stance of ‘dynamic deterrence capacity’. But another expression is used in the text as the idea will cause a criticism that it should be regarded as ‘threats by armed forces’ which Constitution prohibits. (It says ‘to put importance on dynamic deterrence capacity’).
As for commitments in the global security scheme, the guidelines incorporate ‘cooperation with NGOs’ and reexamine the Five Principles on PKO, but this proposal simultaneously undermines neutrality and trust of NGOs as the programs specify a strategy for both the military and civilians to take part in common operations and encourage personnel of PKO to use weapons more frequently.
Concerning the issue of Japan’s arms export, the paper uses an ambiguous expression, ‘to review measures’. It is because the DPJ made a compromise with the Social Democratic Party for a purpose to manage parliamentary procedures smoothly. The DPJ maintains a policy to deregulate prohibitions of weapons’ export.
Military Buildup to Counter China
The guidelines emphasize, excessively, building up military strength in the island areas of Japan’s southwestern region, in which troops of Self Defense Forces (SDF) are scarce at the moment. But in real term the DPJ government takes a counter measure against the Chinese navy and air force. It will station more troops of the ground, air and maritime forces on the Ryukyu Islands area to construct ‘a southwest wall’.
In the Mid-Term Defense Program
The program stipulates a plan to deploy patrol troops of the Ground SDF in the Yonakuni Island, a fresh organization of troops to deploy at the initial stage in Okinawa Island, enhancement of submarine capability, greater mobilization of Destroyer troops, reinforcement of Naha Base by introducing a second fighter squadron, steady-state operation of early-warning aircraft, deployment of follow-on fighters to F4, an extensive use of anti-submarine patrol aircraft, adoption of counter-measures to cruise missiles, deployment of ground-to-sea missiles, routine deployment of MD (=missile defense) troops and six Aegis destroyers around Okinawa, deployment of new-type transport aircraft, intensification of command system, including satellite communication, and organizing a new body to counter cyber-attacks. As the budget size exceeded, the number of tanks and fire arms will be reduced to a third and the personnel of ground force will be decreased by 1000.
China immediately expressed discomfort. Japan’s policies toward the neighbor - ‘a strategic partner’ and ‘East Asia Community’, are incompatible when this extent of war capability is set up. The DPJ government does not have or show a peace initiative, the key of security, infringing Article Nine of Constitution. The New Socialist Party keeps intensively working to curb the dangerous path of the government.
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